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How open innovation affects the
drivers of competitive advantage
Trading the beneﬁts of IP creation and
ownership for free invention
Richard Reed and Susan Storrud-Barnes
Cleveland State University, Cleveland, Ohio, USA, and

Len Jessup
Eller College of Management, University of Arizona, Tucson, Arizona, USA
Abstract
Purpose – This paper aims to explore how community-controlled open innovation affects cost- and
differentiation-based competitive advantage, and to explain how it allows some sources of economic
rent to remain while others are taken away. Although models of competitive-advantage remain
relevant, open innovation means that the main drivers of performance are changed. Open innovation
means that there are implications for ﬁrms’ ability to proﬁt from intellectual property that they do not
own. The paper seeks to address those issues.
Design/methodology/approach – The work is conceptual.
Findings – Economic rents from property rights disappear, those from economies of scale and capital
requirements are reduced, but those from experience-curve effects, differentiation, distribution, and
switching costs remain. Similarly, rents from the difﬁcult-to-imitate resources of networks and
reputation remain intact, and while those from employee knowhow and culture remain, they are likely
to be in reduced amounts.
Research limitations/implications – Propositions are provided for empirical testing. There also is
a need to identify breakpoints between open-innovation beneﬁts and the costs associated with lost
innovation skills, and a need to extend this work to ﬁrm-controlled and third-party controlled open
innovation.
Practical implications – For some ﬁrms open innovation will not adversely affect competitive
advantage but those whose advantage is driven by barriers to entry, skills in innovation and
anticipating customer needs, or that rely on proprietary product designs, can lose in the longer term.
Originality/value – Where the majority of work examining open innovation addresses property
rights, economic rationales, governance, and processes, this work focuses on the effects of open
innovation on strategy content and consequent ﬁrm performance.
Keywords Open innovation, Competitive advantage, Economic rents, Innovation
Paper type Conceptual paper

Introduction
Sawhney and Prandelli (2000) are generally credited with originating the term open
innovation but, since then, Chesbrough’s (2003a) seminal work moved the concept on to
include a variety of ways to capitalize on innovations both externally and internally.
He saw open innovation as a paradigm shift from creating and hoarding innovations
internally to accessing and integrating external knowledge. The latter is based on one
of his key principals of “not all the smart people work for us.” That sentiment has been
taken to heart by Procter and Gamble who now get over half of their innovations from

outside sources. For example, one of Procter and Gamble’s best selling products, the
Spinbrush, a battery operated electric toothbrush, was developed by four
entrepreneurs in Cleveland, Ohio (Chesbrough, 2003b). In addition to ﬁnding
revenue-generating innovations, open innovation has had the added beneﬁt of
improving Procter and Gamble’s R&D efﬁciency (RTM, 2007). Chesbrough foresaw
that open innovation can eliminate innovation costs altogether, but that it constitutes a
two-edged sword because, by eliminating the cost of innovation, it also removes a
barrier to new competition. That, plus other concerns have emerged with the increase
in open innovation; for example, there is the risk of loss of innovation skills, the costs of
coordination can be high, and being able to generate proﬁts is uncertain (Enkel et al.,
2009). The latter continues to be a topic of signiﬁcant interest in both the business
press and trade journals (for example, see Collins, 2007; Hamm, 2007; Howe, 2006;
Lamarca, 2006), but has not received nearly as much academic attention. Consequently,
in this work we explore how open innovation affects ﬁrms’ abilities to generate and
capture the economic rents that accompany the competitive advantage that comes from
controlling the intellectual property that underpins innovations.
Open-innovation takes three main forms: ﬁrm controlled, third-party controlled, and
community controlled. For example, for ﬁrm controlled, Siemens has its own web site
that solicits innovations, as do other companies like the Crown Packing Technology.
Third-party sites, such as InnoCentive.com, which was developed by Eli Lilly and is
also now used by ﬁrms like Boeing and Dupont, typically provide a way for ﬁrms to
post problems so that individuals or organizations can provide a solution and receive a
monetary reward (Howe, 2006). The ﬁnal category of community-controlled sites
includes Elphel, Neuros OSD, Open EEG, Openpandora, Oscar, OSGV, and RepRap
(Abdelkaﬁ et al., 2009; Raasch et al., 2009), among others. Elphel designs
high-performance cameras, Open EEG designs devices to capture neuron feedback
from the brain, Openpandora developed a pocket gamer (now in production), Oscar is
designing a world car with sustainable mobility, OSGV is developing a
seven-passenger SUV with various fuel options, and RepRap is developing
self-replicating 3D printers. These communities can be small (seven people started
Openpandora and 15 people developed the Free Beer community) to very large (an
estimated 30,000 in Neuros OSD), and the innovations that emerge from them can
include new technologies, product improvements, or new product designs. Although
this form of open innovation has received less attention than the other two forms, it is
important because the control of the intellectual property is outside the boundaries of
any ﬁrms wanting to use it (see Ulhoi, 2004). This lack of control of intellectual
property provides a more-stringent test of the models that have served strategic
management well in the past and, consequently, we focus on this form of open
innovation in this work.
Raasch et al.’ (2009) interviews with executives revealed that deriving a proﬁt from
open and easily imitable designs is counterintuitive. So, in this work, we seek to
determine how established thinking on business-level strategy and competitive
advantage is affected by open innovation. Thus, our level of analysis is the ﬁrm and,
speciﬁcally, strategy and performance at the business level. Although some non-proﬁt
organizations have been using open innovation, here, we are assuming the existence of
a proﬁt motive.

Competitive advantage and economic rents
Monopoly rents arise from barriers to competition and barriers to entry that prohibit
potential competitors from satisfying excess demand. The lists of what constitutes
these barriers are numerous, overlapping, and long established in the literature: Bain
(1954, 1956) identiﬁed scale and capital requirements as determinants of entry and, in
his book on Barriers to New Competition, he also emphasized the importance of
product differentiation and absolute cost advantage. Since then, scholars also have
focused on experience-curve effects, capital requirements, customer switching-costs,
access to distribution channels, property rights, and other cost advantages
independent of scale as being sources of barriers to entry (e.g. Karakaya and Stahl,
1989; Lieberman, 1987; Porter, 1980). Synthesizing these, we bound our study and focus
on scale, experience effects, capital requirements, product differentiation, distribution,
and switching costs. Given the nature of this work, we separate out property rights.
Ricardian rents arise from owning scarce and valuable resources (see Mahoney and
Pandian, 1992; Peteraf, 1993). For example, ﬁrms can capitalize on things like a good
reputation because market failure means that such resources cannot be purchased in
factor markets by competitors. Similar to the lists for sources of monopoly rents, there
exist numerous lists of the sources of Ricardian rents. They include resources that are
valuable, rare, and difﬁcult to imitate; durable resources that are not readily
transparent, transferable, or replicable by competitors; and resources that are
heterogenous among ﬁrms and are imperfectly mobile and imperfectly imitable
(Barney, 1991; Grant, 1991; Peteraf, 1993). However, it was Hall’s (1992, 1993) grounded
research that identiﬁed the intangible resources of reputation, employee knowhow,
culture, networks, and databases as being the main sources of sustainable advantage,
which we focus on here as the key drivers of Ricardian rents.
A third type of rents associated with innovation, entrepreneurial rents, are naturally
self-destructive because, with patenting or bringing-to-market a new product or
service, the underlying knowledge is revealed. Given that open innovation
automatically diffuses knowledge, entrepreneurial rents will not exist. That does not
mean that with open-innovation entrepreneurial activity cannot exist. Instead, it
simply means that open innovation removes the need to reverse-engineer products or
circumvent patents. Thus, we restrict our discussion to monopoly and Ricardian rents.
The pairing of those with the fundamental drivers of competitive advantage – cost and
differentiation – provides an organizing framework for the rest of our discussions on
open innovation. That framework and the outcomes of the following discussions are
summarized in Figure 1.
Cost-based advantage and monopoly rents
Open innovation allows monopoly rents from economies of scale, experience-curve
effects, and capital requirements. Marshall (1967) deﬁned economies of scale as “the
advantages created within the plant or ﬁrm, by reason of the increase in the scale of the
plant’s production or of the ﬁrm’s operation.” Stated more broadly, cost savings are
available from efﬁciencies as the ﬁrm increases its size. Even when adopting
open-innovation designs for new products, Lego still beneﬁts from its scale effects in
production and distribution, as does Procter and Gamble with the open innovations it
elects to commercialize. In addition to the obvious scale beneﬁts in operations and
administration, there are other beneﬁts that accrue to larger ﬁrms. For example,

Figure 1.
What open innovation
allows and takes away

research has revealed that ﬁrms with larger numbers of employees are better able to
capitalize on knowledge and knowledge spillovers (Macher and Boerner, 2006). The
beneﬁts of specialization and standardization in operations and administration are
ﬁrm-speciﬁc, as are the beneﬁts of knowledge spillovers. All of these are sources of
barriers to entry and, therefore, monopoly rents should continue to be available
regardless of the source of innovation.
Similarly, we can conceive of no reason why the source of innovation should affect
monopoly rents from experience-curve effects in things like production. Each time
Procter and Gamble doubles output of the Swifferq duster (an external innovation) its
production costs can be reduced by a set amount. Additionally, because
open-innovation tends to be an internet phenomenon, the associated technology may
improve the potential for rents from experience curves in other areas. Amit and Zott
(2001) examined value creation in e-business and developed theory explaining how
transaction efﬁciencies are available, not only for the customer but also for ﬁrms. They
identiﬁed beneﬁts from the interconnectivity that are available with virtual markets,
faster decision making (information is more readily available), streamlined inventory
control and supply-chain management, reduced marketing and sales costs, and better
scalability which, by scaling up, allows scale effects from increased numbers of
customer transactions. Relatedly, the work by Macher and Boerner (2006) revealed

that, in business on the internet, there are beneﬁts to be gained from the skills required
for managing information and knowledge insofar as those skills (and associated
systems) can be honed to further reduce costs. In other words, experience effects exist
in managing knowledge. For example, BT, the telecommunications operator, has been
able to capitalize on externally-designed web interfaces because of the skills of its own
software engineers (Bughin et al., 2008). Additionally, Macher and Boerner found that
experience in knowledge management has a particularly strong effect on performance
when combined with economies of scope, and they observed that employees’ ability to
take ideas from one area and apply them in related areas increased with the experience
that ﬁrms had at working with knowledge. Their results showed that participating in a
wide array of research projects did not in itself improve knowledge utilization and
performance (in fact, it had a detrimental effect on performance), but when combined
with experience, the effect was positive. That means that the ability to tap into the
knowledge of the people who make up an open-innovation community, and then be
able to manage it internally, will create barriers that make it difﬁcult for new entrants
successfully to enter an industry.
It long has been recognized that large capital requirements and access to lower-cost
capital create barriers to entry (Bain, 1956). The rationale for that is readily apparent
and does not need belaboring here. Sufﬁce it to say that regardless of the source of an
innovation, large capital requirements for the purchase of, say, capital equipment, still
create a barrier to entry. However, as discussed below, the nature of internet-based
open innovation means that some of the cost-of-capital barriers are reduced.
Open innovation takes away some barriers from scale and some barriers from the
cost of capital. The majority of thinking on economies of scale was developed before
computers, the internet, and the emergence of open innovation. While that does not
invalidate the underlying logic of barriers to entry from scale, particularly in terms of
things like production, it has been recognized that the internet makes markets more
contestable by, for example, providing equal visibility to all, regardless of size (Goel
and Hsieh, 2002; also see Porter, 2001). That logic also applies to open innovation
because, as already noted, all ﬁrms can beneﬁt from no innovation costs, regardless of
size; i.e. no-cost innovation eliminates the need to amortize innovation costs across
large production-runs. For example, Threadless, the shirt retailer that gets its designs
from, and sells to, on-line customers, has expanded to the point of being able to open a
physical store in Chicago (Bughin et al., 2008).
From surveys of executives it has been determined that, after cost advantages of
incumbent ﬁrms, capital requirements are the next most important barrier to entry
(Karakaya and Stahl, 1989; Karakaya, 2002). Although the effects of the reduction in
barriers from capital requirements may not be as dramatic as the elimination of
product-development costs from open innovation, they still have a negative effect on
monopoly rents. One of the beneﬁts of ﬁrm size is a reduced likelihood of default on
debt, which means that the access to capital is easier and the costs of borrowing are
reduced. That conventional view is being changed by the internet and, as already
noted, open innovation is primarily an internet-based phenomenon. While
capital-market access remains rooted in the relationship that ﬁnancial institutions
develop with the client, the internet has reduced those barriers to entry (Kandampully,
2003). As individuals in open-innovation communities recognize the value of an
innovation, they can be made aware of the ﬁnancial needs of the organization and may

then be willing to risk their own money by providing ﬁnancing. They will become
informal or angel investors and, as Steier and Greenwood (2000) found for open-source
software (e.g. Apache, Linux) such investors can “represent a signiﬁcant source of
venture capital.” This leads to:
P1.

Whereas monopoly rents from experience-curve effects should remain intact,
those from economies of scale and capital requirements will be reduced by
open innovation. Speciﬁcally, rents from barriers to entry will be reduced as
market contestability increases due to the reduced costs of innovation, and
from access to non-traditional sources of capital and the consequent reduced
costs of capital.

Cost-based advantage and Ricardian rents
Open innovation allows some rents from employee know-how, culture, and networks.
Hall’s (1993) study revealed that employee knowhow was rated by managers as one of
the most “durable” and “important contributors to business success.” It includes the
tacit skills and knowledge that make imitation difﬁcult. In addition to the usual
operational and administrative skills that underpin advantage, there also is knowhow
on the integration of the internet and its tools into the business model – it has changed
the way ﬁrms communicate with customers, sell their products, and manage their
supply chain. Similarly, for open innovation, there is a need for know-how in working
with (and not alienating) individuals in the open-innovation community. Nokia is
working on a culture change to incorporate the open-innovation process and, where
Whirlpool uses a more-gradual, stepwise approach to open innovation, IBM threw open
the internet doors to employees and the public in what it termed an “innovation jam”
(Collins, 2007)[1]. Clearly, there is no single template for developing the know-how
necessary for managing open innovation but, once achieved, it becomes a valuable
resource.
Hall (1993) reported that the managers in his survey ranked culture as the most
important resource after employee know-how and product and company reputation. He
found that the valuable components of culture included the “ability to manage change,
ability to innovate, team-working ability, participative management style, perception
of high quality standards, [and] perceptions of high standards of customer service”
(Hall, 1993, p. 617). Assuming managers’ perceptions of value remain constant, a
culture that lends itself to embracing and incorporating the change that is occurring
with the use of open innovation will provide an advantage over ﬁrms where there is
resistance to such change. Such a change has been implemented at Procter and Gamble
with their open-innovation program called Connect and Develop. The program has
moved the culture from one that was insular and shunned products that were not
developed in-house to one that now incorporates product ideas that were “Proudly
found elsewhere” (RTM, 2007). Barney (1986) noted that cultures that are valuable,
rare, and difﬁcult to imitate will confer an advantage. He also noted that many cultures
are easy to imitate and, thus, are not rare. Given the difﬁculty that many ﬁrms have
coping with change, particularly overcoming the “not-invented-here syndrome”, we
can deduce for cultures that value and embrace externally-generated innovations, that
the former condition of inimitability will hold true rather than the latter. Within the
context of working with open-innovation communities, that will then become a source
of cost-based Ricardian rents.

People in the open-innovation community likely will be willing freely to contribute
time to innovations where their input is welcomed. Volkswagen draws on ideas from a
community of Golf GTI enthusiasts and, as work by Fuller et al. (2008) showed, when
their ideas are welcomed, it has a positive impact on their willingness to be involved in
open innovation projects. Extending that, it is likely that there are additional beneﬁts
insofar as the simple act of participating and being able to contribute should help in
retaining the goodwill of the open-innovation community. Not only should goodwill
lead to more cooperation in the innovation process, reducing costs even more, but it
may also mean that more innovations will be forthcoming. In short, if managed well by
the ﬁrm, there is a “feel-good” effect for members of the open-innovation community
that is self-reinforcing. Managing the process well means that the skills embodied in
team-working abilities and participative management are complementary to what is
happening in the open-innovation community, which, in turn, should lead to more rents
in the form of even greater difﬁcult-to-imitate efﬁciency.
Networks – the human relations that transcend the requirements of organization
and commercial relationships – have become a favorite research topic in management,
whether they are at the level of the organization or the individual[2]. It is the latter that
is of relevance here because open innovation means that it is individuals, albeit in a
community, with whom the ﬁrm has to work. The VP for Innovation at Procter and
Gamble explained: “When you’re inventing within your own walls and boundaries, you
have a lot of positional power – command and control is hierarchical. But when you’re
leveraging people whom you don’t have direct control over, you have to build
relationships and trust” (RTM, 2007). Those relationships and trust are particularly
important in the case of open-innovation community leaders. Research has revealed
that open-innovation community leaders not only have the required technical skills,
they also have the ability to encourage the volunteers to coalesce behind a common
goal (Fleming and Waguespack, 2007). Given that both managerial and innovation
performance are products of managers’ micro-social processes within networks and the
consequent variety of knowledge to which managers are exposed, we may expect that
there should be the opportunity for accessing and recombining knowledge held by
these leaders and elites in the open-innovation community that will help reduce costs of
both organization and operation[3]. Therefore, the network of contacts and
relationships with individuals also should constitute a rent-generating resource.
Databases were a resource that managers in Hall’s (1993) study perceived as being
important for sustaining competitive advantage. However, even as Hall was
conducting his research, the use of relational databases (e.g. SQL Server, Oracle,
DB2) was becoming common-place in business. The next generation of information
technology, the one that is replacing those legacy databases and also now is starting to
become prevalent in large organizations, is enterprise-planning software (e.g. SAP,
PeopleSoft/Oracle). The software contains customized databases that facilitate the
integration of manufacturing, marketing, accounting, and so forth, to improve
efﬁciency in the process of creating and delivering goods to customers. As yet, and as
far as we are aware, no software includes the facility for integrating open innovation
into the database. Should that ever occur, the software will provide an advantage to
those organizations that purchase it, but the advantage will be temporary as other
organizations are able to purchase it and re-level the playing ﬁeld. We thus set aside
the use of databases as a source of Ricardian rents.

Open innovation takes away some of the value of employee knowhow on
ﬁrm-generated innovation. Enkel and colleagues noted that too much openness may
not be a good thing for the longer-term because it can erode core (innovation)
competencies (Enkel et al., 2009). Those competencies, which are embedded within
R&D activities, organizational routines, and organization culture are required for
capitalizing on innovations procured externally (Veugelers, 1997). The longer-term cost
manifests itself in lost synergy gains from the interaction with external sources of
innovation and the consequent spillover that ends up as new innovations that,
otherwise, would not have been recognized. Research (e.g. Audretsch and Keilbach,
2007) has shown that situations that are knowledge impoverished generate fewer
spillover entrepreneurial-opportunities than those that are not.
Whether or not open innovation will completely replace traditional approaches to
innovation is difﬁcult to predict but, as open innovation gains strength, and as ﬁrms
strive to compete with others that have adopted open innovation, the emphasis on
traditional approaches likely will decline because the open-innovation community
works for free. Even though some managers, like those at Procter and Gamble, are
keenly aware of the importance of retaining a strong internal R&D function, managers
who are under pressure to improve returns in the short-term may reduce spending on
internal innovation (RTM, 2007). In short, the knowhow associated with these
conventional approaches to innovation will deteriorate as innovation skills, absorptive
capacity, and the organizational routines that produce the ability to innovate are
diminished or lost. For example, Boeing has long realized that when it comes to
innovation, you “use it or lose it” (Gunter, 2002). That not only means that revenue
potential is lost but also that the average cost of innovation is higher than it otherwise
would be. Thus:
P2.

Whereas cost-based Ricardian rents from organization culture and networks
should remain intact, those from employee knowhow will be reduced by open
innovation. Speciﬁcally, as ﬁrms rely more on open innovation, their ability to
innovate using traditional internal sources will diminish and the opportunity
costs of missed chances for innovation synergies and spillovers will increase.

Differentiation-based advantage and monopoly rents
Open innovation allows monopoly rents to be extracted from product differentiation
and customer switching costs. Differentiation arises from several sources and, as
Karakaya and Stahl (1989, p. 85) state:
Established ﬁrms have brand identiﬁcation and customer loyalties stemming from past
advertising, customer service, product differences, or simply being ﬁrst into the market.

Clearly, the idea of differentiation creating a barrier to entry is heavily inﬂuenced by
traditional views on marketing but, with open innovation, marketing requirements
likely will change. Some ﬁrms already have learned that lesson. As already mentioned,
Volkswagen has tapped into the Golf-GTI community for innovations, and Ducati,
Harley Davidson, and Nike have capitalized on innovations suggested by their own
communities (Fuller et al., 2008). At Niketalk community members created new
features for basketball shoes that they want, and presumably value, which means that
they are perfectly differentiated. Per conventional wisdom, increased differentiation
means higher barriers to entry and, thus, increased monopoly rents.

Amit and Zott (2001, p. 508) explained how, among other things, e-businesses ﬁnd
“new ways of conducting and aligning commercial transactions . . . [and] creating
value by connecting previously unconnected parties, eliminating inefﬁciencies in the
buying and selling process through adopting innovative transaction methods,
capturing latent customer needs (such as haggle-free car purchasing from the
convenience of your home), and/or by creating entirely new markets (e.g., auctions for
low-ticket items).” As open innovation becomes more widespread and an accepted way
for companies to do business, open-innovation communities, being driven by
self-interest, likely will identify even more links, connections, methods of transaction,
and latent markets to serve even more of their needs (i.e. they will create even more
opportunities for differentiation). In turn, word-of-mouth recommendations within
open-innovation communities take on a new importance as online-community
members proselytize products to others (Fuller et al., 2008).
Switching costs are the costs incurred when a buyer switches from one supplier’s
product to another’s. However, even when switching costs exist, it does not mean that
ﬁrms using open innovation cannot coexist with businesses using traditional
approaches to innovation. For example, as we have witnessed for open sourcing of
software, Linux and Microsoft coexist, and we now are witnessing the coexistence of
goods developed through open innovation by organizations like the Whirlpool with
more-traditionally developed offerings (Collins, 2007). If the ﬁrm using open innovation
is ﬁrst to market then the second entrant needs a constant source of new customers or
existing customers that are willing to switch, which means that the good has to provide
signiﬁcant beneﬁts above and beyond the cost of switching. If the open-innovation
product is second to the market, then it faces the same problems. Beyond that no-effect
scenario, open innovation can lead to increased switching costs because, as Amit and
Zott (2001) noted, existing views on resource-based theory include the concept of
complementarity among assets as a source of value creation, and they go on to explain
how value can be created by bundling complementary products. Because bundling
provides efﬁciencies for customers, and because people are nothing if not self serving,
it is likely that open-innovation communities will tend to produce innovations
incorporating bundles of goods. The bundles and efﬁciencies they desire creates
increased differentiation which means they also will incur increased switching costs.
Therefore, barriers competition and new entry, and the consequent rents from
switching costs should, at a minimum, continue to be available with open innovation.
Conventional wisdom (e.g. Porter, 1980) also holds that the importance of channels
of distribution for creating monopoly rents comes from the barriers to new entry that
arise either when incumbents control channels (e.g. the industry is vertically
integrated), or when distributors are satisﬁed with the products and services provided
by established ﬁrms. The underlying rationale was pre-internet and clearly based on
the distribution of products through resellers. Today, there are competing views on
what has happened to the beneﬁts of channel control. First, favorable word-of-mouth in
online communities about the service provided by a distributor allows the distribution
channel to retain its barrier-to-entry properties (Flavian and Guinaliu, 2005). Second, it
has been argued that the technology reduces the power of wholesalers and retailers
insofar as it allows customers to deal directly with suppliers, which eliminates the need
for “middlemen” (Porter, 2001). Either way, the effect is a reinforcing of the barriers.
Such is particularly the case with ﬁrms dealing with open-innovation communities.

Contact with community members is established prior to any sale and, assuming that
members of the open-innovation community have an interest in purchasing a product
they have helped develop, that contact allows the ﬁrm sell the product directly. Some
ﬁrms (e.g. Threadless and Muji) have taken that one step further by getting preorders
from the innovating communities they work with prior to any production (Bughin
et al., 2008; Ogawa and Pillar, 2006).
Open innovation takes away the barriers created by traditional means of protecting
property rights and from the control of distribution channels. Given that we primarily
are concerned with the effect on ﬁrms using innovations where the intellectual
property remains under the control of the open-innovation community, or the
community makes it free to all, patents and secrecy are not available to the ﬁrm.
Therefore, in short, no control over the intellectual property effectively eliminates that
potential for monopoly rents. Therefore:
P3.

Whereas monopoly rents from differentiation, distribution-channel control,
and customer-switching costs should remain intact, those from the possession
of intellectual property will be reduced by open innovation. Speciﬁcally, as
ﬁrms rely more on open innovation, rents from barriers to entry from
proprietary intellectual property will be reduced.

Differentiation-based advantage and Ricardian rents
Open innovation allows ﬁrms to continue to beneﬁt from reputation, employee
knowhow, and organization culture. In Hall’s (1993) survey, managers rated reputation
as being a major contributor to sustainable advantage. Their judgment is supported by
an array of research that conﬁrms the existence and validity of the link between
reputation and ﬁrm performance (e.g. Black et al., 2000; Graham and Bansal, 2007;
Gregory, 1998). A good reputation is a resource that is valuable and difﬁcult to imitate
and, although it easily can be damaged, it also can be durable (Carter and Rueﬂi, 2006).
Thus, ﬁtting with the resource-based view, it is an intangible resource that can be a
source of Ricardian rents – customers are willing to pay a premium for goods from
ﬁrms with a superior reputation – and that condition should hold regardless of the
source of an innovation. Hall (1993, p. 616) stated:
The emphasis placed on this resource by CEOs suggests that a key task of management is to
make sure that every employee is disposed to be both a promoter and a custodian of the
reputation of the organization . . .

That notion extends to members of the open-innovation community. Clearly, as the
Senior VP for R&D and the VP for Innovation at Procter and Gamble recognized,
members of innovation communities are not employees but, because of their
involvement in the innovation process, there is the potential for an afﬁnity with the
created product and its producer (RTM, 2007). Those contributing to open-innovation
projects are likely to take ownership of the product they have helped create, which
means they likely will recommend it to others (see Wind, 2006, who argued that people
become advocates for companies and recommend goods and services to others).
Amit and Zott (2001) identiﬁed a concept of “lock-in” for e-businesses, and it applies
here. They noted how lock-in arises from resources such as brand name and trust. In
their research on the Volkswagen community, Fuller et al. (2008) found that brand
passion led to brand trust which, in turn, led to active participation in open-innovation

projects. Thus, under conditions of open innovation, ﬁrm brand – and we also include
reputation – remain a valuable and difﬁcult-to-imitate resource, which means they can
be a source of Ricardian rents. Amit and Zott (2001, p. 507) also explained that the
interactions between community members become “network generators” as one
member of the network has “an effect on the production or utility function of other
participants in the network. . . and e-business operations can be designed to harness
the power of this lock-in mechanism.” In short, branding (and reputation) take on a new
importance when open innovation is introduced into the process of creating and
producing goods, and its rent-generating potential should thus remain intact.
Hall’s (1993) study identiﬁed perceptions of high quality and perceptions of high
customer service as being important parts of culture that contributed to sustained
advantage. Within the extensive literature on quality management there are no
dissenting voices on the importance of top-management commitment to quality, the
creation of a supportive culture, and the importance of employee education and
training for being able to deliver quality. Similarly, on customer service, both the
organization-behavior and marketing literatures have emphasized climate and culture
as important mechanisms for employee guidance[4]. We already noted that Hall
reported that managers ranked culture as the most important resource after employee
knowhow and product and company reputation, and we explained how Procter and
Gamble has adjusted their culture to better work with open-innovation communities.
And, coming full circle, there clearly exists a relationship between a culture of quality
and customer service and branding and reputation. So, in terms of open innovation, we
can deduce that culture also is a source of rents.
Open innovation takes away some employee know-how and some beneﬁts of
organization culture. Employee know-how is valuable not only in terms of improving
operational efﬁciencies, but also in being the cornerstone of anticipating customer
needs. Customer intimacy is one of the things that helps ﬁrms to create value for which
customers are willing to pay. In their study of market leaders, Treacy and Wiersema
(1995, p. xv) noted that:
Customer-intimate companies do not pursue one-time transactions; they cultivate
relationships. They specialize in satisfying unique needs, which often only they, by virtue
of their close relationship with – and intimate knowledge of – the customer recognize.

They also explain that intimate knowledge goes beyond developing a relationship with
the customer to include “breakthrough insights” that permit the identiﬁcation of “total
solutions” to customers’ needs. While this ability to identify unrealized customer needs
is rooted in employee knowhow, the desire to identify such needs and to commercialize
them is driven by organization culture (see Mitsch’s, 1990, discussion of 3M).
As previously noted, as ﬁrms rely more on open innovation, the ability to innovate
may well diminish or be lost altogether. Not only will design skills be lost, but
employees will not acquire the knowledge required to be able to create what customers
do not know they need, nor will they be driven by the tradition of translating those
needs into commercial goods. The danger of relying solely on open innovation already
has been recognized by managers at Proctor and Gamble (RTM, 2007). Thus, ﬁrms’
ability to separate themselves consistently from other companies by producing the
products that spawn new markets will be reduced, as will the availability of Ricardian
rents:
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Whereas differentiation-based Ricardian rents from reputation should remain
intact, those from employee knowhow and organization culture will be reduced
by open innovation. Speciﬁcally, as ﬁrms rely more on open innovation, rents
from the ability to anticipate customer needs will be reduced.

Discussion
Openness to new ideas from the environment improves ﬁrms’ innovation performance.
Laursten and Salter (2006) found that as the breadth and depth of searching using
external actors and sources increased, so did innovation, and that while too much
searching led to diseconomies and performance deterioration, openness to new ideas
from the environment is superior to a closed, in-house, internal focus on innovation.
Consequently, more and more ﬁrms are ﬁnding value by tapping into the ideas of online,
open-innovation communities. In this work we have explored what happens to the
drivers of competitive advantage and consequent economic rents when ﬁrms use
innovations from communities that are not ﬁrm sponsored and not sponsored by a third
party. We deduced that open innovation modiﬁes the sources of monopoly rents for
industry incumbents from barriers to entry: while rents from property rights disappear,
and those from economies of scale and capital requirements will be reduced, those from
experience-curve effects, differentiation, distribution, and switching costs will remain.
Similarly, Ricardian rents from the valuable and difﬁcult-to-imitate resources of
networks and reputation should remain intact, and while those from employee knowhow
and culture will remain, they will be in reduced amounts. Some of those monopoly and
Ricardian rents that remain available may, however, take on the form of the shorter-lived
quasi rents as things like product differentiation becomes easier to imitate because these
community-led innovation groups make technology and designs freely available. That
means that things like ﬁrm reputation become even more important for sustaining rents.
Synthesizing these conclusions, we can deduce that while many of the fundamentals of
our existing models of strategy still work in the face of this new source of innovation, the
way we view and use them will have to be adjusted. That means adjusting, rather than
abandoning, our dominant paradigm and rethinking some of our research questions.
There is a tradeoff between the beneﬁts of open innovation and the beneﬁts of
internally-generated innovation. That raises the question: at what point do the beneﬁts
of reduced innovation costs from open innovation stop outweighing the increases in
costs that come from lost scale and synergy effects in innovation, from reduced
abilities to anticipate customer needs, and from not being able to eliminate or control
competition by owning the intellectual property that surrounds an innovation? We
have focused on community-controlled open innovation because it provided a more
stringent test of the drivers of competitive-advantage, but the other forms of open
innovation – ﬁrm controlled, third-party controlled – also need to be assessed for their
impact on competitive advantage. It may be that equiﬁnality exists among the different
forms when matched with differing ﬁrm innovation skills and cultures, but that needs
to be conﬁrmed through empirical research.
There are numerous contingencies that also need to be incorporated as we move
forward with both theory and empirical testing. For example, here we implicitly held
constant the type of innovation – radical versus incremental innovation, architectural
versus component, or competence-enhancing versus competence-destroying
innovation. We held constant the effects of network externalities and the installed

base which, in varying degrees, have implications for both monopoly and Ricardian
rents. Further, having managed to access an open-innovation community, and
assuming that, as described, there are rents available, the question becomes can the
ﬁrm appropriate them? Grant (1991) explained how the appropriation of rents can be
difﬁcult if the resources that created them are vested in the skills of an individual. The
“elite” members of innovating communities have power and may be able to bargain
with the ﬁrm for special deals (preferential prices, payments, perquisites) that erode
rents. In other words, they may behave like powerful employees and appropriate rents.
If the ﬁrm does not provide what are deemed to be adequate discounts or perquisites,
and because the organization has no control over them, they can stop cooperating and
encourage less elite members of the community to do the same. This scenario ﬁts
closely with Amit and Zott’s (2001) observation that peer recommendations have a
downside because they can turn into a “dangerous downward spiral”.
In terms of the implications for practice, we can deduce that ﬁrms whose competitive
advantage is driven by experience-curve effects and employee knowhow in operations
can capitalize on the beneﬁts of open innovation with little risk of losing advantage.
Similarly, the risk is limited for those whose advantage comes from differentiation,
distribution-channel control, switching costs, and reputation. However, ﬁrms whose
competitive advantage is driven by barriers to industry entry, existing innovation
abilities that drive synergies in capitalizing on external innovation and in spillovers, that
depend on their innovation skills for anticipating their customers’ needs, or that rely on
proprietary product-designs, risk losing advantage by using open innovation.
Clearly, there are risks associated with the use of open innovation. However, not
using open innovation may be even riskier. Although research on the phenomenon of
open innovation continues to gather momentum, there is much that is yet to be done. In
this work we have provided insight into the effects on the drivers of competitive
advantage. The next stage is to take this thinking on content and to interpret it into
models of process that can be translated into normative recipes to guide ﬁrms in the
quest to capitalize on the open-innovation phenomenon.
Notes
1. Collins (2007) also linked Whirlpool’s use of open innovation with its return to proﬁt growth.
2. This deﬁnition of networks is from Hall (1993). As noted, research on networks is extensive.
Examples of research at the level of organization includes work by Echols and Tsai (2005);
Schilling and Phelps (2007); Tsai (2001). At the level of the individual it includes work by
Nooteboom (2000); Rodan and Galunic (2004).
3. This argument is based on the ﬁndings of Rodan and Galunic (2004).
4. This observation on the commonality between the literatures was made by Bowen (1990).
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